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The Asian/Chinese Century from the Chinese Perspective1 
Chengxin Pan* 
Deakin University 
Front and centre in Australia’s contemporary discourse about Asia is no 
longer the ‘Yellow Peril’, but the Asian Century. Nowhere is this new 
Asia discourse more prominent than in the recently released White Paper 
titled Australia in the Asian Century, whose broad themes on getting on to 
the Asia bandwagon have received rare bipartisan support in Canberra. 
Yet, in China, one of the main actors in the so-called ‘Asian Century’, this 
concept has yet to be widely embraced. While there has been some upbeat 
Chinese assessment of China’s future in the new century, overall Chinese 
attitude has been characterised by ambivalence, caution and even 
scepticism about this notion (and its ‘Chinese Century’ variant). This 
article examines both Chinese perspectives on the Asian/Chinese Century 
and their implications for Australia’s engagement with Asia and China. It 
argues that the Chinese ambivalence, conditioned by their historical 
memory and contemporary awareness of the US-dominated strategic 
order, needs to be taken more seriously by Australian observers and 
policy-makers, for such China knowledge could help Australia better 
reflect on its own hope and anxiety about the future of Asia and its at 
once promising and uneasy place within the region.  
 
World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the 
absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning. -  Georg 
W. F. Hegel2  
 
Neither political Space nor political Time are natural resources. 
They are ideologically construed instruments of power.  - 
Johannes Fabian3 
Introduction  
One does not have to be a regular shopper to notice the ubiquity of 
consumer goods that are now made in China, from toys to clothes, from 
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luggage to LCD screens, from cameras to birthday candles. A bestseller 
vividly depicted the enormous challenge faced by an American family 
who once tried to live without ‘Made in China’.4 Of course, things that 
are not China-made still exist, but it seems that the easiest place to find 
them is not in shops or supermarkets, but in the marketplace of political 
ideas. This is especially true with some popular phrases in relation to 
China itself: ‘Greater China’, ‘the Beijing Consensus’, ‘the China Model’, 
‘String of Pearls’, ‘first island chain’, ‘A2/AD’ (anti-access, area denial), 
‘the China price’ – the list goes on.  
I count ‘the Asian Century’ among this long list of phrases. 
Though it is the catchphrase of the Australia in the Asian Century White 
Paper (thereafter, the White Paper), this term is not an Australian 
invention, nor is it a recent addition to the international political lexicon. 
As early as 1985, the US Senate hearings on security and development 
assistance used the term in the following context: ‘leaders of the region 
began talking about a coming economic leap that would propel them 
into an “Asian century”’.5 The hearings gave no reference as to who 
those leaders actually were, but according to some commentators, its 
origin could be traced back to the late Chinese paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping. Deng did use a similar term, but it was three years later. 
During his 1988 meeting with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, he 
said that ‘[i]n recent years people have been saying that the next century 
will be the century of Asia and the Pacific, as if that were sure to be the 
case. I disagree with this view.’6 Obviously Deng did not lay claim to the 
authorship of this notion. Explaining his objection to it, Deng reasoned 
that ‘No genuine Asia-Pacific century or Asian century can come until 
China, India and other neighbouring countries are developed’, which 
seemed to him unlikely any time soon.7  
A quarter of a century later, however, with China emerging as the 
world’s second largest economy and India the third largest (on a 
purchasing power parity basis), the Asian Century seems to have well 
and truly arrived. Looking ahead, the White Paper paints an even more 
exciting picture of what is to come:  
 
Within only a few years, Asia will not only be the world’s largest 
producer of goods and services, it will also be the world’s largest 
consumer of them. It is already the most populous region in the world. In 
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the future, it will also be home to the majority of the world’s middle 
class.8 
 
If the Asian Century has indeed become ‘a defining feature of the 21st 
century’, 9  it follows that the rest of the world, including Australia, 
should better engage Asia. But to deepen the engagement, it is 
imperative that Australia should better appreciate how Asia thinks 
about itself, its place, and indeed ‘its’ century. China, which would 
account for about a quarter of the world’s economic output and half of 
Asia’s by 2025,10 has been and will continue to be a key driver in the rise 
of Asia. Thus, understanding Chinese perspectives on the Asian Century 
is critical to our effective engagement with the rising Asian powerhouse. 
Further, getting to know what the Chinese think about themselves and 
their place both in the world and in this century is integral to what is 
meant to be China literate. 
Given that China is frequently a reference point in Chinese 
understanding of the Asian Century, this article will look at how both 
‘the Asian Century’ and ‘the Chinese Century’ have been received in 
China. Though by no means two interchangeable concepts, they are 
closely interlinked in the Chinese discourse. It is true that the White 
Paper does not mention ‘the Chinese Century’ (or China’s century), but 
the generous space it gives to China clearly implies that an Asian 
Century without China would not be the Asian Century Australian 
policymakers had in mind. Thus, it is only appropriate to bring ‘the 
Chinese Century’ concept into this ‘Asian Century’ analysis. 
Few scholars would need to be reminded that there is no such 
thing as the quintessential Chinese perspective on the Asian/Chinese 
Century. Still fewer would claim to be able to canvas the full spectrum 
of diverse Chinese perspectives. What is attempted below, therefore, is a 
quick and sketchy snapshot, which hopefully can nevertheless serve as a 
starting point for further discussion and dialogue on this subject matter. 
In the absence of a quantitative survey on this subject, this essay 
provides a mostly qualitative first-cut by focusing on articles published 
in Chinese newspapers, journals, and magazines. In doing so, it leaves 
out overseas Chinese perspectives or views from Hong Kong, Macau or 
Taiwan as well as views expressed by other means. For example, online 
33 
Griffith Asia Quarterly 1 (1) 2013 
 
information has become a valuable source in many respects, but at least 
on this topic most web-based materials have in fact been drawn on 
existing print media and publications.  
To give an indication of how popular ‘the Asian Century’ and ‘the 
Chinese Century’ are in the Chinese discourse, in early 2013 I conducted 
some searches in China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database 
(CNKI), one of the most comprehensive and authoritative Chinese 
publication databases. CNKI consists of two main subsets of database: 
China Core Newspapers Full-text Database and China Academic 
Journals Full-text Database (which includes news and popular 
magazines as well as academic journals). Within the newspaper 
database, my searches of the precise phrases ‘亚洲世纪’ (Asian Century) 
and ‘中国世纪’ (Chinese Century) as a subject returned surprisingly only 
4 and 8 articles respectively. When ‘亚洲世纪’ was searched in full-text, 
51 articles emerged, with about 12 of them related to Australia’s Asian 
Century White Paper. A similar search found 42 articles where the 
phrase ‘中国世纪’ appears at least twice in each article.11  
In the second database, my searches of the two phrases as a subject 
returned respectively 137 and 339 articles published between 1986 and 
2012. Considering that this database covers approximately 9,800 journal 
and magazine titles, this is not a huge haul. By comparison, a search by 
the subject “和平发展” or ‘peaceful development’ found about 5,350 
articles in the same period. Between 2009 and 2012, only 21 
journal/magazine articles were found to be directly about ‘the Asian 
Century’ (this excludes many articles which simply mention that phrase 
in passing). In 1997 and 2005, Chinese interest in the ‘Asian Century’ 
appeared to be at its peak, as respectively 12 and 27 journal/magazine 
articles on the topic were published, well above the yearly average of 5.7 
articles. These spikes, however, are mainly due to Chinese reporting and 
commentaries on the surge in Western interest in Asia, rather than a 
reflection of greater home-grown interest in this debate. For example, 
1995-1996 saw the publication of Jim Rohwer’s Asia Rising and John 
Naisbitt’s Megatrends Asia, both of which predicted the coming of the 
Asian Century. 12  Similarly, in May 2005, coinciding with Newsweek 
magazine’s cover story on the ‘Chinese Century’, Fortune Global Forum 
was held in Beijing, featuring the theme ‘China and New Asian Century’. 
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Thus, Chinese interest in this debate is by and large sporadic and 
reactive in nature.  
Still, China’s relative silence on this notion is in itself interesting, 
all the more so given that the country is widely billed to be a central 
player in the Asian Century. Clearly, in this case silence does not mean 
acquiescence or quiet acceptance. In fact, reading through the small 
number of articles that do engage with this concept at some length, one 
can detect some ambivalent, often sceptical or even critical attitudes 
towards the ‘Asian Century’ and ‘China Century’ claims.  In the pages 
that follow, I will chart those views from both intellectual and official 
sources, before concluding with some brief observations on the 
implications for Australia’s Asia/China engagement.  
 
The Asian/Chinese Century: Its Supporters and Sceptics 
If there is such a thing as national psyche, contemporary Chinese 
national psyche has been acutely torn between a longing for national 
renewal and an almost equally strong reluctance to attract international 
attention to its new-found wealth and power. The first dimension of the 
national psyche has its root in the national humiliation suffered during 
its modern encounters with Western imperial powers. The second is a 
reflection of a traditional Chinese mentality that cautions against 
‘showing off’ one’s wealth or talent lest one become the target of envy or 
fear. Chinese attitudes towards the term ‘Greater China’, a term which 
was briefly in vogue in the late 1980s and 1990s, reveal this profound 
emotive ambivalence. After some initial enthusiasm about the 
emergence of ‘Greater China’, China effectively abandoned that notion, 
as it quickly became apparent that in Western eyes it was more often 
than not reminiscent of some more sinister analogies such as the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Greater Germany.13 In many ways, 
Chinese responses to the notions of the Asian/Chinese Century can be 
understood within a similarly Janus-faced structure of feeling of 
anticipation and hesitation. Perhaps such an ambivalent structure of 
feeling is more pronounced in the case of ‘the Chinese Century’ than ‘the 
Asian Century’, but the main purpose of this article is not to 
systematically compare the two in the Chinese discourse, but rather to 
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first flesh out the hitherto little-examined Chinese perspectives on this 
general debate.  
On the one hand, some scholars and commentators are confident 
that the Asian/Chinese Century is not a pipe dream, but an unfolding 
reality.14 Justin Yifu Lin, former Chief Economist at the World Bank, is a 
prominent example of this school of thought. Writing for the BBC, Lin 
argues that ‘[w]hether we are on the verge of an “Asian Century” or not, 
one thing is clear: there has already been a dramatic shift in the 
geographic centre of the global economy.’ 15  Though mindful of the 
challenges of the contagion from the eurozone, sluggish market demand 
from advanced economies, as well as China’s myriad domestic 
imbalances, Lin is nevertheless optimistic that China will become the 
‘leading dragon’ in the world economy, accompanied by the emergence 
of the Chinese currency as a global reserve currency.  
While not using the term ‘Asian Century’ or ‘Chinese Century’, 
Liu Mingfu, a professor at China’s National Defence University, argues 
that there will be a ‘China era’ (中国时代) in the post-American world. 
By his definition, the ‘China era’ means not only an era when China 
becomes the world’s largest economy, or when it tops the world in terms 
of material productive capabilities, but also an era when Chinese culture 
and spirit become the world’s mainstream or dominant culture.16 
The late Chinese Indologist, linguist and writer Ji Xianlin also 
believed that the twenty-first century will be the century of the East, 
especially in a cultural sense. He is well known for conveying his view 
through the popular Chinese saying ‘三十年河东，三十年河西’ (people 
east of the river prosper for thirty years, and the next thirty years are the 
turn of those on the west of the river). Influenced perhaps by a 
combination of dialectical Marxism, traditional Chinese cyclical view of 
history and his knowledge on Eastern culture, Ji Xianlin saw the arrival 
of the ‘Asian Century’ as a certainty, resulting from both the growing 
limitations of analytical ways of thinking in Western culture and the 
need for more holistic ways of thinking as embodied in Chinese and 
Eastern cultures.17 
In the general public, the idea of a Chinese century seems to have 
also attracted some followers. A 2009 online survey conducted by 
Tencent (QQ.com), one of China’s largest Internet service providers, 
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indicates that 49.93 per cent of the 12134 respondents believed that the 
twenty-first century would certainly be the Chinese Century, while 31 
per cent disagreed, with the remaining undecided.18 Since the survey 
does not provide data on the general profiles of its respondents, it is 
difficult to contextualise the survey results. But given that such websites 
often attract younger, tech-savvy users, one may assume that the results 
better reflect the views of young Chinese than the broader Chinese 
populace. Also it is likely that some respondents might come from 
outside China. 
However, despite the popular belief in the ‘Asian Century’ (or 
‘China era’) in some quarters of Chinese society, overall this idea seems 
to have not caught on in Chinese intellectual and media circles. In 
comparison to the enduring and often open obsession with building and 
sustaining the American Century in the United States, the Chinese 
interest in the Asian or Chinese Century is lukewarm at best. Renowned 
economist Wu Jinglian once remarked that in the face of heated 
international discussion on the East Asia Miracle and Asian Century, the 
Chinese remained unexcited or indifferent. Few Chinese scholars, he 
argued, cared to look into the policy sources of the so-called ‘Asia 
Miracle’.19 Even some of the most vocal nationalistic voices, such as 
those represented by the book China Can Say No, have yet to latch onto 
the grand notion of the Asian or Chinese Century. For instance, in China 
Can Say No, the authors proclaim that China doesn’t want to lead 
anyone in the world, except minding its own business.20  
Instead, the more prevailing Chinese attitude to the alleged 
Asian/Chinese Century has been caution. For many observers, while the 
possibility of an Asian Century cannot be ruled out, it is premature to 
declare how the whole twenty-first century will eventually pan out. 
Notable for their patience and long memory, the Chinese often hold the 
view that a man’s merits and demerits can be finally appraised only 
after his death. In an oft-repeated story, when asked by the visiting US 
President Richard Nixon (or his State Secretary Henry Kissinger 
according to another version of the story) what he thought was the 
historic impact of the French Revolution, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 
allegedly replied: ‘It’s too soon to tell.’21 While this favourite quote may 
have been a typical example of ‘lost in translation’, many Chinese would 
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agree that the defining feature of the new century is indeed too soon to 
tell.   
Other commentators question the wisdom of the Asian/Chinese 
Century from a global or humanist perspective. For example, while 
acknowledging the shift of economic centre of gravity towards the Asia 
Pacific, Tang Renwu, a professor at Beijing Normal University, argues 
that in the multipolar, interdependent world of the twenty-first century, 
the world is unlikely to have only one single economic centre. Both the 
Asia Pacific and the Atlantic, he argues, will qualify as such centres. 
Consequently, the twenty-first century will not be an exclusively Asia 
Pacific or Atlantic Century, but a ‘Global Century’.22 Echoing this line of 
reasoning, Zhu Xiangyuan, a member of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, argues that with the multipolarisation of 
world politics and the globalisation of world economy, what we are 
witnessing is not a Chinese Century or Asia Pacific Century, but a 
‘Global Century’ or a century for all humanity.23  
Still other sceptics turn to empirical evidence. Despite the great 
strides made by China and other Asian economies, Asia as a whole is 
seen as still lagging behind the West on a number of fronts, such as 
science and technology, modern institutions, management expertise, and 
the ethos of freedom and openness. Zhu Xiangyuan argues that 
modernisation is not just about economic modernisation, but also 
includes the modernisation of democratic political system, social 
harmony, and national culture and citizen character. 24  While 
Confucianism and Asian values more broadly may have some admirable 
merits that are relevant to the modern age, they are also seen as 
discouraging independence, creativity, and challenge to authority, all of 
which may stifle innovation and future development. Thus, some warn 
that one should not simply extrapolate the current dynamic 
development in Asia to an Asian Century. Just as one millennium ago 
China was at the heyday of economic and scientific development but 
eventually fell behind, today’s economic prosperity in China/Asia does 
not necessarily mark the beginning of an enduring Asian ascendancy.25 
Even at the economic level, although many would disagree with 
the ‘China collapse’ argument,26 China’s economy is not as robust or as 
competitive as it appears. At one level, despite the much-taunted 
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phenomena of ‘China Inc.’ and ‘China goes global’, the Chineseness of 
China’s economic dynamism has been called into question. While many 
Western observers continue to marvel at its economic miracle, many 
Chinese know too well that ‘made in China’ is not necessarily made by 
China, nor does China receive the lion’s share of profit.27 At another 
level, it is widely agreed that economic performance cannot be 
measured by GDP alone, but also by capacities for innovation, 
competitiveness, energy/resource efficiency and environment 
sustainability.28 From this standpoint, China has a long way to catch up 
with Japan, let alone the United States.29 The now disgraced Chinese 
politician Bo Xilai once famously said that in order for China to buy one 
Airbus A380, it would need to sell 800 million shirts.30 The larger point 
here is that the Chinese Century, if it did come to pass, would not be 
based on ‘Made in China’ alone. Rather, it needs to be underpinned by 
‘Created in China’ (中国创造).31 Moreover, the current world currency 
order is still dominated by US dollar. At an international conference on 
‘Financial Supervision in East Asia’ in late 2010, some Chinese scholars 
maintained that unless this order was reformed to better reflect Asia’s 
financial interest, no matter how big Asian economies had become, the 
Asian Century would not materialise.32   
Asia’s diversity, complexity and unevenness are believed to 
further complicate the emergence of an Asian Century. It is often noted 
that Asian countries do not experience uniform economic development, 
with hundreds of millions of people still living in poverty today.33 The 
unevenness is not only visible across countries, but also within them. It 
was on this account that Deng Xiaoping cast doubt on the imminent 
arrival of the Asian Century. The economic rise of China and India 
today may have exceeded Deng’s expectations, but the whole of Asia is 
more than China and India.  
Unlike Europe and North America, Asia has no common market, 
nor is it a coherent entity.34 In fact, as both Western and Chinese scholars 
have noted, ‘Asia’ as a seemingly homogeneous geographical/cultural 
space was a European construct.35 Although China, Japan, and Korea 
have each signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN, the trilateral free 
trade agreement negotiations among these three Northeast Asian 
powers have just begun, which face the competition from the US-led 
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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Though the US may not openly admit it, 
the TPP is in part aimed to consolidate the US-led Pacific Century,36 if 
not primarily to foil the emergence of a China-led Asian Century.  
Strategically, Asia remains a very volatile region. To date, the 
prediction of an Asian Century has been based largely on Asia’s 
economic performance. Yet, for all its importance, economy is only part 
of the new century equation. Political power is equally, if not more, vital 
in shaping the contours of the twenty-first century. The director of 
National Institute of International Strategy at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences Li Xiangyang argues that to become a real economic 
centre in the world, Asia needs to play a more active political role in 
making global rules and norms, but thus far that is not happening.37 
Furthermore, when it comes to security Asia and its adjacent regions 
have been fraught with some of the world’s most intractable hot spots: 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle East conflicts, Iran nuclear stalemate, 
terrorism, instability in Central Asia, India-Pakistan rivalry, North Korea 
nuclear crisis, as well as the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea and over the Diaoyu (Senkaku in 
Japanese) islands have further laid bare the fragile nature of Asian 
security order. As this region faces the most complex and potentially 
most explosive security challenges, it is doubtful that Asia would be 
ready for an ‘Asian Century’. Many analysts point out that an 
economically booming Asia does not necessarily mean that its security 
challenges and flashpoints will easily go away or that Asian values such 
as collectivism, filial piety, thrift and work ethic will automatically gain 
universal appeal.38 
While most Chinese scholars and commentators doubt the claim of 
the Asian/Chinese Century on the basis of ‘empirical’ evidence and 
perceived internal problems and challenges facing the region, some 
observers criticise these notions for their ‘undesirable’ international 
implications. For instance, senior veteran diplomat Wu Jianmin argues 
that such expressions remind people of the numerous wars, aggressions 
and plunders associated with the emergence of the European Century in 
the nineteenth century and that of the American Century in the last 
century. In his view, Asia as one of the biggest victims of those wars and 
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aggressions should not repeat the developmental path trodden by the 
US and European powers.39 
Also, in Chinese culture being the top dog (or in Chinese terms, 
the top tree) has its risks. As the saying goes, ‘taller trees catch more 
wind’, an experience China can already relate to with its sudden 
elevation to the No. 2 spot in the global pecking order. With the region 
already becoming ‘an object of global envy’,40 crowning the twenty-first 
century with the Asian/Chinese Century is likely to draw even more 
unwanted international attention to China. Seeing the ‘China threat’ 
argument as a response to China’s rise, some Chinese observers treat the 
‘Chinese Century’ narrative as a variation of the ‘China threat’ argument. 
In an interview with Global Times, Fudan University professor Wu Xinbo 
stressed that Western claims of the Chinese Century could easily fuel the 
fear of China.41 According to Liu Zhenye, underlying the widespread 
discourse of the ‘Chinese Century’ is Western anxiety about the 
uncertain implications of China’s rise for Western (especially US) 
dominance in the international system. 42  Jin Canrong and Dong 
Chunling note that such anxiety and fear has already prompted the US 
to ‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific with a vengeance. As quarrels inhibit 
cooperation and suspicion erodes trust in the region, they warn that 
Asia runs the risk of being embroiled in a new round of great power 
competition, with the ‘Asian Century’ turning into an internecine ‘Asian 
tragedy’.43  
Though a clear minority, other observers go so far as to hint at a 
‘conspiracy’ by the West, particularly the US, to artificially inflate 
China’s power in order to justify their plot of containing China. In a 
media report, Zhao Xiao wrote that  
When the US cried out in alarm the ‘Japan threat’ in the 1980s, Japan 
subsequently fell into a decade-long recession; when the world sounded 
the alarm of the coming of the Asia Pacific era in the 1990s, Asia then 
mysteriously got bogged down in an unprecedented financial and 
economic crisis. Today, when people outside China, whether with good 
will or malicious intention, are cheering the coming of the Chinese 
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Such a ‘conspiracy’ theory about ‘the Asian/Chinese Century’ has only a 
niche market in the Chinese intelligentsia, but its existence illustrates the 
depth of the cautious dimension of the Chinese psyche. This explains 
why few Chinese buy, for example, Martin Jacques’ argument in his 
book When China Rules the World, which has been seen as an attempt to 
‘捧杀中国’ (kill China with excessive praise).45    
 
From the Asian Century to the China Dream? Views from Beijing and 
Beyond 
While the Chinese public and intellectual community may be divided on 
the ‘Asian/Chinese Century’ issues, neither term has made its way into 
the official lexicon of the Chinese leadership. Beijing’s longstanding line 
of argument has been that China is still a large developing country. 
According to former Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu 
Jintao, this basic national condition remains unchanged. In his 18th 
Party National Congress report, Hu used the words ‘世纪’ (century) five 
times, with four of them appearing in the cliché ‘in the new stage in the 
new century’. If it means anything, this phrase seems to denote a period 
of ‘volatile international situation and unprecedentedly fierce 
competition in comprehensive national strength’, rather than an 
‘Asian/Chinese’ century.46 Even during his opening ceremony speech at 
the 2005 Global Fortune Forum on ‘China and New Asian Century’, Hu 
did not mention the phrase except in a brief reference to the Forum’s 
theme.47 
If Deng Xiaoping’s advice is still any guide to understanding 
Chinese politics today, the lack of official endorsement of the 
Asian/Chinese Century comes as no surprise. Deng’s disapproval of the 
‘Asian Century’ was based not only on the long-term challenge of Asia’s 
common development, but also on his political strategies of ‘韬光养晦’ 
and ‘决不当头’ (keep a low profile and never take the lead).48 These 
strategies, along with ‘有所作为 ’ (make useful contributions), have 
continued to guide China’s foreign policy making. The Chinese 
government takes pains to emphasise that China is still at an early stage 
of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Realising that with 
power comes responsibility, it may be a deliberate strategy for China to 
cling onto its ‘developing country’ status so that its economic 
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development would not be unduly constrained by its international 
responsibility for combating climate change. Similarly, keeping a low 
international profile enables China to concentrate on its domestic 
priorities without alarming its neighbours and other great powers. To 
defuse international concerns about a Chinese hegemon on the horizon, 
Beijing has long carefully watched its words and deeds lest that they 
encourage such an impression. For example, as if its ‘peaceful rise’ 
strategy were not reassuring enough, Beijing soon changed the term to 
the colourless and less provocative term ‘peaceful development’.49   
Of course, it may be argued that Beijing’s strategy of ‘keeping a 
low profile’ only belies its ambition to dominate the twenty-first century 
when its time comes. For example, its constant reference to ‘the great 
renewal of the Chinese nation’ might be just such a telltale sign of 
China’s grand strategy. In Hu’s 2012 party congress report, this phrase 
was mentioned 14 times. Indeed, since Xi Jinping came to power in late 
2012, he has crystallised this goal into the catchphrase ‘中国梦’ (the 
China dream). He predicts that by 2049 when the People’s Republic 
celebrates its 100th anniversary, the Chinese dream of national renewal 
will come true. However, apart from the vague connotations of building 
a strong and prosperous China and assuming China’s rightful, 
autonomous place in the family of nations, what the China dream would 
entail remains unclear. If by this it means that the Middle Kingdom will 
regain its past glory, then it may well amount to a de facto Chinese 
century. Or at least some may interpret it that way.50  
As mentioned at the beginning, this ambiguity in the Chinese 
official stance on China’s future reflects the broader national 
ambivalence about its identity and global role.51 Conditioned by both 
vivid memory of its century of humiliation and acute awareness of a less 
than hospitable international strategic environment, this ambivalence 
will not fade away or be easily resolved. The Chinese are conscious that 
the largest obstacles to their national renewal, apart from myriad 
domestic problems, come from the very perception that China’s rise will 
usher in a Chinese (or Asian) Century. Yet ironically, China’s continued 
ambiguity on its trajectory and strategic objective in turn has tended to 
aggravate the nagging uncertainty about China felt in the international 
community.   
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In this context, I argue that the concern about whether China or 
Asia will ‘own’ and dominate the new century reflects not so much the 
ambition and grand design of China or other Asian countries. Rather, it 
tells us more about the Western/American anxiety that their century 
might come to an abrupt end as well as about their desire and hope to 
prolong their century as far into the future as possible. There is no 
contradiction between the constant talk about the arrival of the 
Asian/Chinese Century and the insistence that the American Century 
should continue. Rather, they are the two sides of the same coin.  
Here, at the risk of oversimplification, underlying the international 
debate on the Asian/Chinese Century is the difference – when it comes 
to understanding time and history – between Chinese and Asian 
countries on the one hand, and the US and Western countries on the 
other. Claiming to be the children of the Enlightenment and modernity, 
the West in general and the US in particular have tended to view history 
in a linear, progressive fashion. In this sense, it is easy to understand 
why there has been ‘a continuity of futurism in mainstream American 
international theory.’52 This, together with the Judeo-Christian tradition 
of linking time with a chosen people (or region),53 explains the Western 
fascination with questions such as whether we have reached the end of 
History and whether the twenty-first century is an Asian, Pacific, or 
American one. From the ‘White Man’s Burden’ to the US’s ‘manifest 
destiny’, the West and the US have customarily claimed to be the chosen 
people/country to lead the world ‘because no one else can’.54 It is in this 
context that the earliest sign that someone else (either China or Asia in 
general) might be able to take over that role seems deeply unsettling: it 
flies in the face of how the West has come to define itself. If history is 
linear, then the Asian Century could well mean that the era of the 
West/US would be lost forever.    
As noted above, for the most part, China has been careful to avoid 
touching that raw nerve in the American psyche. This caution has less to 
do with its false modesty or art of deception than to do with its mostly 
sincere sense of inadequacy and its cyclical view of time and history.55 If 
time is cyclical in nature, then the Asian/Chinese Century, even if it has 
dawned, might prove to be temporary. The quick shift in international 
opinion about the merits of the Asian model after the Asian financial 
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crisis seems to lend credence to such prudence: Western claims of the 
‘Asian Century’ could come and go within a matter of years, if not 
months. And many would remember that not long before the current 
‘Asian Century’ fever, Asians (along with Africans) had been dubbed 
‘people without history’.56 
To be sure, some Chinese have warmed to a linear view of history, 
thanks to the influence of Marxism and modernity in general. One of the 
most popular concepts in the Chinese IR discourse, for example, is ‘时代’ 
(era).57 But they tend to characterise time in broad thematic terms, rather 
than tying it with a spatial or national ribbon. For instance, following 
Deng Xiaoping, most in China still regard this century as the era of 
‘peace and development’, which succeeded the era of war (Mao Zedong) 
and that of imperialism and revolution (Lenin and Stalin). Insofar as 
they continue to see this era as development, this is a tacit recognition 
that the twenty-first century is still the continuation of an era started and 
dominated by the West, with China still playing catch-up in the 
modernist pursuit of economic development.  
 
Sino-Australian Relations in the ‘Asian Century’ 
Given the broad Chinese scepticism about the claim of the Asian 
Century, Chinese reactions to Australia’s Asian Century blueprint have 
thus far focused less on the merits of the Asian Century per se, and more 
on what this blueprint means for Australia’s policy towards Asia in 
general and China in particular. Most Chinese commentators see the 
release of the White Paper as a positive step in Australia’s long and 
sometimes troubled engagement with Asia’s rise. 58  Quite a few 
newspaper opinion pieces use the word ‘拥抱’ (embrace) to describe 
Australia’s latest Asia overture.59 One article approvingly notes that in 
comparison with the ‘China threat’ theme in Canberra’s 2009 Defence 
White Paper, the 2012 White Paper provides an explicitly positive 
assessment of China’s development and perceives China’s military 
growth as ‘a natural, legitimate outcome of its growing economy and 
broadening interests’.60  
At the same time, many also point out that Australia’s embrace of 
Asia has been driven mainly by economic interests, rather than genuine 
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identification with Asia in political and cultural terms (the White Paper’s 
emphasis on learning Asian languages and cultures notwithstanding).61 
Thus, questions remain about Australia’s sincerity in its commitment to 
the Asian Century and the mindset upon which its Asia literacy effort is 
based. Both the recently strengthened Australia-US alliance and 
Australia’s suspicion of Chinese investment have been singled out as 
evidence that at the back of its mind Australia seems to continue to treat 
Asia (and in particular China) as ‘the Other’.62   
What should Australia make of these Chinese perspectives on the 
Asian Century? Insofar as Canberra’s ‘Asian Century’ rhetoric has a 
primarily domestic audience in mind, it is tempting to suggest that 
Australia need not take seriously what China thinks about the Asian 
Century. As one government adviser involved in the drafting of the 
White Paper noted, the White Paper was mainly about getting ‘our own 
house in order’.63 Even so, it would be unwise to ignore Chinese views 
on an issue putatively central to Australia’s future prosperity and 
security, if not its identity. Australia’s enthusiasm about the 
Asian/Chinese Century and the US’s resolve to maintain its 
preponderance in Asia illustrate precisely the dual, complex 
connotations of the Asian/Chinese Century the Chinese feel deeply 
ambivalent about.  
To many Chinese, an inevitable question is how the Asian/Chinese 
Century, if it were true, could co-exist with the American Century. 
Indeed for Australia, such a pointed question is no longer just a 
hypothetical scenario, but a reality. In recent years, Australia has 
debated about this paramount strategic challenge,64 but such a debate is 
often too self-centred, with little attention paid to how the Chinese (and 
Asian people in general) perceive the alleged Asian/Chinese Century 
and the alleged ‘power shift’. But pay attention we must, as the future of 
Asia will ultimately be jointly constructed by Asian countries as well as 
influenced by Western perceptions and policies. While we need not 
necessarily replace our optimism about the Asian Century with 
pessimism, or substitute our new sense of urgency with usual smugness 
and complacency simply because the Chinese feel ambivalent about it, at 
least the ways in which China thinks about the ‘Asian/Chinese Century’ 
could help put into perspective our teleological hope and (perhaps to a 
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lesser extent) fear about the future of our geography. In any case, 
genuine Asia/China literacy, one of the key capacities identified by the 
White Paper as essential to Australia’s prosperity in the ‘Asian Century’, 
is not to be gained through old-fashioned, Orientalist representations of 
Asia as ‘threat’ and/or ‘opportunity’. Rather, it has to emerge out of a 
sensitive, humble, and intersubjective process of engagement, dialogue 
and self-reflection. If ‘the Asian Century’ rhetoric can in some way help 
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